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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JEFFERY GENE SPRAGUE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960154-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment
of conviction entered February 12, 1996.

This Court has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I:
Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on
counts I, III, VII, VIII, X, and XI charging Appellant Jeffery
Sprague with burglary of storage units where the only evidence of
entry into the units was the fact the locks had been cut and the
doors opened?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
This Court will reverse a criminal case for insufficient
evidence when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that "reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime."

State

v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994).

The evidence is

reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Id.

PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE:
Prior to trial, counsel moved to prohibit the State from
proceeding on those counts where it had not secured the owners of
the units to testify as to entry.

R. 371-75.

After the State

rested, counsel moved to dismiss the above counts.

R. 671-73.

Post-conviction, counsel moved for an arrest of the judgment.
R. 229.
ISSUE II:
Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by allowing
evidence that on March 29, 1995, the night prior to the charged
crimes, the same storage facility had been burglarized?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
A trial court's decision to admit evidence under Rule
404(b) will be reviewed with very limited deference, according it
a relatively small degree of discretion.

State v. Doporto, 308

Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 1997).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE:
Counsel objected to the admission of evidence of the
March 29 burglary both before trial and throughout the trial.
R. 377 -78; 391-3; 465-69; 482; 484-85; 488; 785-86.

TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1995) provides:
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any
2

portion of a building with intent to commit a
felony or theft or commit an assault on any
person.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(4) provides:
"Enter" means:
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under
control of the actor.

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.

Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith.
It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The State charged Appellant Jeffery Sprague

("Sprague")

and a co-defendant with thirteen counts of Burglary, third degree
felonies; Possession of Burglary Instruments, a class B
misdemeanor; and Theft by Receiving, a class B misdemeanor.

The

State alleged that on March 30, 1995, Sprague burglarized
thirteen storage units, possessed bolt cutters used to cut the
locks, and possessed a lock stolen from one of the units.
3

On

November 16, 1995, Sprague was found guilty after a two-day jury
trial on all counts.

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on

the burglary counts against the co-defendant but found him guilty
of possession of burglary tools and stolen property.
Prior to trial, Sprague's counsel moved to prohibit the
State from referring to burglary counts where it had not secured
the owners to testify as to whether property was moved about or
missing from inside their units.

Counsel argued that without the

owners1 testimony, the State could not prove entry on those
counts.

R. 371-75.

The trial court denied the motion.

R. 375.

After the State rested, defense counsel moved to dismiss burglary
counts I, III, VII, VIII, X, and XI on the grounds that the State
had not established a prima facie case on the element of entry.
R. 671-73.

The trial court noted that the evidence was thin but

ruled that sufficient evidence had been presented to send those
counts to the jury.

R. 674-75.

On December 8, 1995, Sprague ! s

counsel filed a motion to set aside the verdict for insufficient
evidence.

R. 229.

the motion.

On February 12, 1996, the trial court denied

R. 791-92.

Also, prior to trial, counsel moved to suppress evidence
that on March 29, 1995, the night before the charged burglaries,
the same storage facility had been burglarized.

R. 378.

The

locks on a half dozen units had been cut and the unit doors
opened.

One unit was burglarized both on March 29 and March 30.

The State sought to introduce evidence that a computer key board
of the same make as one stolen from one of the units on March 29
4

had been found in Sprague's car the night of his arrest on
March 30, 1995.

R. 376-87.

The trial court granted defense

counsel's motion to suppress evidence of the keyboard because the
State violated the rules of discovery by failing to provide
counsel with the police report identifying the keyboard as
possible stolen property, and because its admission was unfairly
prejudicial to Sprague's co-defendant.

R. 3 87.

The trial court did allow the State to present evidence
of the March 29 burglary on the grounds that it was "relevant in
allowing a full development of the case," and because "there was
a relationship that could be established between the earlier
activity and the present activity that had some probative
significance to the alleged activities of defendants on the
30th."

R. 787.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early hours of March 30, 1995, officers Benzon and
Ricks of the West Jordan Police Department were driving by
Central Storage on 1700 West and 7210 South when they noticed
that the gate to the property was open.

R. 504; 550.

Upon

further investigation they noticed that the lock had been cut to
the gate.

R. 505.

The locks had been cut to thirteen storage

units and the doors opened.

R. 493; 524; 550-51; 571; 596-98.

Pieces of broken locks were scattered on the ground.
576-81.

R. 551;

Unit number 309 had an overlook with a red warning label

on it because the owner had failed to pay rent.
5

R. 601-02.

That

lock was missing.

R. 602.

While the officers were investigating the scene, they
observed a Jeep Wagoneer apparently start to pull into the
driveway of the storage unit.
oncoming lane of traffic.

R. 553.

The Jeep crossed over the

When it got to the point where the

police vehicle parked near the gate was visible, it veered away
driving past the storage unit on the wrong side of the road.
R. 506; 508-09; 554-55.
vehicle over.

Officers Benzon and Ricks pulled the

R. 509-10; 555-56.

his co-defendant was the passenger.

Sprague was the driver, and
R. 511.

Prior to being told

why he was stopped, Sprague insisted that he had not stolen
anything.
locks.

R. 556: 20-25.

Inside the vehicle were several cut

R. 513; R. 614: 20-22.

One of the locks bore the same

red label as the overlook missing on unit number 309.

R. 52 0-21.

The manager was able to open the lock with his master key.
R. 601.

The police also found a flashlight, a pair of bolt

cutters, and a computer keyboard in the vehicle.

R. 512; 516;

533-34; 615.
Robert Brinkman, a "criminalist" with training in tool
marks, testified for the State.

R. 644-45.

Brinkman claimed

that all bolt cutters, even those of the same run, make and
manufacturer, left a distinctive mark when used to cut metal.
R. 648-49.

Using equipment intended to compare bullets, Brinkman

claimed that the marks left by the boltcutters found in Sprague's
car matched the marks left on one of the locks found in Sprague's
car and one of the locks found lying on the ground at the storage
6

units.

R. 647; 649; 652-53.
The owners of seven of the units testified that either

some of their property was missing, or that someone had rummaged
through their belongings but nothing was missing.
421-22; 428; 438; 447; 457; 499.
testify.

R. 416-17;

Two of the owners did not

Four owners testified that none of their property was

missing and nothing had been disturbed.
Sprague did not testify.

R. 433; 443; 451; 642.

He did offer alibi evidence

that on the night of March 29 to the early hours of March 30, he
was with his wife.

Sprague's wife testified that Sprague was

with her from about 6:00 p.m. on March 29 until he left at
1:45 a.m. to take home her brother, the co-defendant.
Mrs. Sprague stated they were at a bowling alley from about
9:45 p.m. to around midnight.

From the bowling alley, they went

to the VFW Lounge until 1:00 a.m. and then returned home.
R. 677-81.
Alan Keefe, the bartender at the VFW Lounge, testified
that though he did not know Sprague by name, he recalled seeing
Sprague and his wife from about 10:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. one night
near the end of March.

R. 692-96.

Ron Babcock, manager of All Star Lanes, also did not know
the Spragues personally, but remembered seeing them towards the
end of March between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and midnight.
R. 710-14.
Jack Jennings, the co-defendant, testified that he
babysat for the Spragues that night.
7

R. 724-26.

Sometime around

1:50 a.m., Sprague gave him a ride home.
been drinking and was swerving.

R. 728.

Sprague had

Jennings stated that they saw

the lights at Central Storage, but denied that Sprague started to
pull into the storage units before being pulled over by the
police.

R. 730-37.
Terry Jennings, Sprague's father-in-law, testified that

he loaned the bolt cutters to Sprague on March 29, the day
Sprague was arrested.

R. 698-99.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There was insufficient evidence to establish the element
of entry in Counts I, III, VII, X, and XI.

The only evidence of

entry was the fact that the locks had been cut and the doors
opened.

The State argued that because the other units had been

entered, the jury could infer that the remaining units were also
entered but that Sprague found nothing to steal.

This is an

impermissible inference because it essentially relieves the State
of having to prove each element of each charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The State's argument is the equivalent of

saying that if it showed Sprague was guilty of burglarizing some
of the units, the jury could simply assume he was guilty of the
others without independent evidence of the element of entry.
This inference violates Rule 404's prohibition against the
introduction of evidence of other crimes to show the defendant
acted in conformity with his propensity to engage in criminal
conduct.
8

The trial court erred by allowing evidence of the
March 29 burglary of storage units.

The March 29 burglary was

not so linked to the March 3 0 burglary in time and circumstance
that the State could not coherently present its case without it.
The March 29 burglary was not admissible as part of a common plan
or scheme or as evidence of a modus operandi under Rule 404(b).
The commission of a series of burglaries with no distinctive
features did not constitute an overall plan of which the March 29
burglary was a part or a modus operandi.

Lastly, there was not

sufficient evidence connecting Sprague to the March 2 9 burglary
to make it probative of identity.
Even if evidence of the March 29 burglary were admissible
under Rule 404(b), its probative value was so marginal that it
did not outweigh the prejudice to Sprague.

The State's

presentation of evidence of the March 29 burglary cast suspicion
on Sprague, and the clear implication was that he committed them
both.

The resulting confusion of the issues was prejudicial to

Sprague.

He essentially was forced to try to defend against both

accusations.

Unlike, his co-defendant, Sprague only had an alibi

for the March 30 burglary.

The jury may have believed Sprague's

alibi created a reasonable doubt as to the March 3 0 burglary, but
convicted anyway because of the inference that he was responsible
for the March 29 burglary.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH THE ELEMENT OF ENTRY IN COUNTS I, III,
VII, VIII, X, AND XI CHARGING SPRAGUE WITH
BURGLARY.
In order to sustain a challenge based on insufficient
evidence, the appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting
the trial court's decision, including all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, and demonstrate it is legally insufficient.
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The following adverse evidence was presented by the State to
establish the element of entry:
1.

Wesly Taylor, the manager of the storage

units, testified that the locks to all the units in
question had been cut and the doors to the units were
open.

R. 597-98.
2.

The owners of the units not in question

testified that either property was missing from their
units or their belongings had been rummaged through.
R. 413-17; 420-22; 427-28; 436-38; 444-47; 456-57; 499.
3.

The owners of units 309 and 456 in Counts III

and VII did not testify.
4.

The owners of units 307, 455, 706 and 707

testified that the locks had been cut and the doors were
open on their units.

None of their property had been

disturbed or stolen.

R. 432-33; 442-43; 451; 642.

From the above evidence, the jury could have concluded
10

that because the locks were cut, the doors open, and entry had
clearly been made into seven of the thirteen units, Sprague
entered the other units as well but simply found nothing he
wanted to steal.1

A. THE STATE CANNOT RELY ON EVIDENCE THAT SOME
OF THE STORAGE UNITS WERE ENTERED TO PROVE THE
ELEMENT OF ENTRY ON ALL OF THE UNITS.
The elements of burglary are set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1995):
A person is guilty
remains unlawfully
of a building with
theft or commit an

of burglary if he enters or
in a building or any portion
intent to commit a felony or
assault on any person.

Entry is a crucial element of the offense of burglary.
At common law, burglary involved breaking and entering the
dwelling house of another at night with the intent to commit a
felony.

Model Penal Code and Commentaries 221.1, 61.

In most

jurisdictions, the definition of burglary was later greatly
broadened to include a much larger range of conduct.

The initial

development and later expansion of the crime of burglary was
largely in response to defects in the early law of attempt.
Burglary is in essence an attempt to commit another crime.

Id.

at 61-63.
The common law of attempt ordinarily did not
reach a person who embarked on a course of
criminal behavior unless he came very close to
1

. For the sake of clarity and concision, counsel has cited
only to that evidence relevant to the element of entry.
For a
complete recitation of all the evidence presented at trial, see the
Statement of Facts section of this brief.
11

his goal . . . Making entry with criminal intent
an independent substantive offense carrying
serious sanctions moved back the moment when the
law could intervene in criminal design and
authorized penalties more nearly in accord with
the seriousness of the actor's conduct . . . On
the other hand, a greatly expanded burglary
statute authorizes the prosecutor and the courts
to treat as burglary behavior that is
distinguishable from theft or attempted theft
only on purely artificial grounds . . . Entering
a henhouse to steal a chicken became a serious
offense while stealing a chicken at the henhouse
door was merely petty larceny.
Id. at 63-63.
For this reason courts have been reluctant to adopt
statutory interpretations of the entry element which would
further expand the crime of burglary.

For example, in State v.

Loncrstreth, 832 P.2d 560, 564-65 (Wyo. 1992), the court rejected
the State's argument that when the underlying felony in a
burglary charge is arson, proof that a fire occurred
automatically satisfied the element of entry.

In United States

v. Eichman, 756 F. Supp. 143, 148 (S.D.N.Y 1991), the court
declined to accept the government's theory that entry occurred
when the defendant climbed on the roof of a building to set fire
to a flag.

Citing the common law history of the crime of

burglary, the court refused to expand the concept of entry to
include the activity on the roof of the building.

Id.

In this case, the State opted not to submit to the jury a
lesser included instruction on attempted burglary.

The State

instead chose to rely on the argument that since there were
multiple charges of burglary, it need only prove entry on some
counts and not all.

The State claimed that if it proved Sprague
12

had entered seven of the thirteen units to commit a theft, he had
probably entered the other six as well.

R. 235-36, 673-74.

This

Court should not allow the State to circumvent a crucial element
of the burglary statute by relying largely on evidence of other
crimes as proof of entry.
The law does not permit the State to argue or the jury to
infer that if it found Sprague was guilty of burglarizing some of
the units, it could assume his guilt of burglarizing the others.
State v. Doporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 1997) (evidence
is not admissible to show a defendant's propensity to commit
criminal acts).

Essentially, this line of reasoning allows the

jury to conclude that if Sprague is guilty of some charges, he is
probably guilty of the others without independent evidence to
support the element of entry on each count.
This reasoning violates the long-standing rule of law
that one crime cannot be offered to prove the defendant committed
another similar offense against a different person.

.Id. at 21;

People of the Territory of Utah v. Coucrhlin, 44 P. 94, 95 (Utah
18 96).

This principle of law has been carried over into modern

rules of evidence and procedure.

For example, Rule 404(b), Utah

Rules of Evidence prohibits the introduction of evidence of other
crimes to prove the defendant's propensity to commit crime.

It

is improper for a prosecutor to argue that because a defendant
has been convicted of burglary in the past, he is probably guilty
of a current charge of theft.
1372 (Utah 1986).

State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368,

A defendant is entitled to severance of the
13

charges where joinder allows the jury to use evidence of his
prior crime as the basis for an inference that he committed
current charges of burglary and theft.

State v. Saunders, 699

P.2d 738, 741-42 (Utah 1985).
Rule 404(b) does allow evidence of prior crimes as
evidence of a common plan or scheme.

State v. Featherson, 781

P.2d 424, 428 (Utah 1989); State v. Forsvth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176
(Utah 1982).

Even if evidence of the other burglaries were

admissible under a common scheme rationale, such evidence would
not establish actual entry.

An individual acting under a common

scheme could stand at the threshold without entering.

Nothing in

the evidence suggests that part of the common plan was to enter
each unit.

Lastly, the common plan or scheme theory does not

allow the State to essentially avoid its duty to prove each
element of each count of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt.

The

State cannot rely on the fact that it proved entry on some of the
counts to relieve its burden to show entry on all the counts by
arguing that there was an overall plan to burglarize storage
units.
Indeed, even if those counts where entry was shown were
the subject of a prior prosecution, evidence of those burglaries
would not be admissible in a subsequent trial to prove entry on
the remaining counts under Rule 4 04(b).
Evidence of an extrinsic offense may be
admissible when it logically raises an inference
that the defendant was engaged in a larger, more
comprehensive plan. The existence of a plan then
tends to prove that the defendant committed the
14

charged crime, since commission of that crime
would lead to the completion of the overall plan.
United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1331 (5th Cir. 1981) .
Evidence of the larger plan or scheme must also be relevant to a
material issue in the case.

Id.; Featherson, 781 P.2d at 428.

In this case, that issue would be entry.

Evidence that

Sprague entered some units does not automatically lead to the
inference that he entered others.

At best, it demonstrates a

tendency to commit burglaries of storage units.

Evidence of

other crimes is not admissible for this purpose.
For example, in Krezdorn, the defendant was charged with
four counts of forgery.

The trial court admitted evidence of

thirty-two additional uncharged forgeries as part of a common
plan or scheme to commit forgeries.

639 F.2d at 1331.

The Fifth

Circuit held that evidence that the defendant committed the crime
more times than he was charged with did not constitute a common
plan.

Ld. at 1331-32.

The court noted that the fact that there

were thirty-six forgeries instead of four did not establish
anything but a repetition of similar criminal acts.

The court

reasoned that at best, the evidence merely demonstrated the
defendant's propensity to commit forgeries and was not admissible
under Rule 404(b) for that purpose.

Id.

B. EVIDENCE THAT THE LOCKS WERE CUT AND THE
DOORS OPEN WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE UNITS WERE ENTERED.
Lastly, the fact that the locks were cut and the doors
were open is not sufficient alone to establish the element of
15

entry.

People v. Simien, 656 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1983) .

In Simien,

the defendant was convicted of burglary of a trailer.

The jury

heard evidence that the trailer door had been opened.

The only

other evidence that the trailer had been entered was the fact
that a roll of roofing material of the kind stored in the trailer
had been removed and was lying on the ground.

The owner was

unable to say whether the roll had been there when he left the
evening before the crime.

Id. at 700.

The Colorado Supreme

Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that the trailer had been entered.

Id.

In this case, the fact that the locks were cut and the
doors opened may show a substantial step towards the commission
of a burglary, but it is insufficient to establish that Sprague
actually entered the storage unit.

Because the doors slide

upwards like a garage door, they are easily opened without having
to actually enter the unit with hands or feet.
Exhibit 8) .2

Compare

with

(See State ! s

State v. Peterson, 881 P. 2d 965 (Utah

Ct. App. 1994) (kick to open door held sufficient to establish
entry).

It is purely a matter of speculation as to whether the

perpetrator entered the open units or simply stood on the
threshold and looked inside.

Therefore, Sprague!s conviction on

these counts should be reversed and remanded for dismissal.

2

. The photographs included in the record appear to be from
the preliminary hearing as the exhibit numbers do not correspond
with the transcript. The actual photos submitted at trial are in
the District Court. Counsel has requested that such photographs be
transmitted to this Court.
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POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL

ERROR BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO HEAR EVIDENCE THAT
THE STORAGE UNITS HAD ALSO BEEN BURGLARIZED THE
NIGHT BEFORE.
The trial court erred in allowing evidence of the
March 29 burglary of the storage units.

The court initially

stated that it was not admitting the evidence under Rule 4 04(b).
R. 787.

Later, the court ruled that evidence of the prior

burglary was admissible in order to allow the State to fully
develop its case.

The court also held that there was a

relationship between the earlier burglary and the present charges
which was probative of the defendants1 activities on March 30.
R. 787.

Lastly, the trial court ruled that the evidence did not

prejudice the defendants because it allowed them to offer a
defense for the March 29 burglary.

R. 787-88.

Though the trial

court claimed that it was not admitting the evidence under Rule
404(b), its rationale for allowing the evidence clearly falls
within Rule 404(b)'s ambit.
Evidence of the March 29 burglary was initially submitted
by the prosecution in an attempt to tie the activities of Sprague
to both burglaries under the rubric of a common plan or scheme.
R. 379-80, 383.

The State charged Sprague with burglary.

The

mere fact that the State presented extensive evidence of the
March 29 burglary cast additional suspicion on Sprague.

The jury

was told the number of units that were broken into on March 29.
R. 482-84.

A State's witness marked the location of those units.

R. 482-84.

The jury heard evidence from three different State's

witnesses that on March 29, the locks on additional units had
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been cut and the doors opened.

R. 502-04; 548-50; 592-93.

police officers testified about the March 29 burglary.
04; 548-50.

Two

R. 502-

Sprague's co-defendant offered an alibi for the

March 29 burglary.

R. 709.

The average juror would surely assume the State was
offering this evidence against the defendants in its case in
chief for a reason.

The natural and clear implication was that

Sprague committed both burglaries.

In fact, the trial court

recognized that implication when it stated that the co-defendant
was "helped" by the evidence of the prior burglary.

The trial

court stated that because the co-codefendant had an alibi for the
March 2 9 burglary, his defense to the March 3 0 burglary was
strengthened.

R. 787-88.

Unlike the co-defendant, Sprague did

not have an alibi for both nights.
Rule 4 04(b) provides the only means by which this
evidence could be admitted.

Because of its inherent inflammatory

potential, evidence of prior crimes is presumed to be
inadmissible.

Doporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21.

Prior to

admitting prior bad acts evidence, the trial court must find
that:
(1) there is a necessity for the prior crime
evidence, (2) it is highly probative of a
material issue of the crime charged, and (3) its
special probativeness and the necessity for it
outweigh its prejudicial effect.
Id. at 21.
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A. EVIDENCE OF THE MARCH 29 BURGLARY WAS NOT
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 404B FOR THE PURPOSE OF
ALLOWING THE STATE TO EXPLAIN THE CONTEXT AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE MARCH 3 0 BURGLARY.
Evidence of prior crimes is admissible where the
"uncharged offense is so linked together in point of time and
circumstances with the crime charged that one cannot be fully
shown without proving the other."

Krezdorn, 639 F.2d at 1331-32

(5th Cir. 1981); State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah 1989).
Under this exception, evidence of the prior crime is necessary to
explain the context, circumstances or setting of the crime
charged in order to "complete the story."

The justification for

allowing the evidence is that it would otherwise be impossible
for the State to present a coherent story of the events
surrounding the charge.
F.2d at 1331-32.

Nelson, 777 P.2d at 481; Krezdorn, 639

The trial court relied, in part, on this

exception in allowing the evidence of the March 29 burglary.
R. 787: 8-11.
Evidence of other crimes may not be admitted "simply
because it recounts events temporally related to the commission
of a crime for which the accused is on trial."
Childs, 598 F.2d 169, 173 (C.A.D.C. 1979).

United States v.

This exception hinges

on the State's showing of necessity and does not automatically
make admissible prior bad act evidence simply because the events
took place close in time to the charged crime.

See also Johnson,

748 P.2d at 1075. Doporto made it clear that 404(b) evidence must
be necessary.

3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22.

independent, threshold requirement.
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Necessity is an

Even if the evidence is

probative, even if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect, the State must show that its admission is essential to
establishing its case.

This independent requirement prevents the

State from gratuitously capitalizing on the highly prejudicial
impact of 404(b) evidence.

The State must justify its use of

404(b) evidence by establishing that admission of the evidence is
unavoidable or compelled by the circumstances of the case.
For example, in Nelson, the court allowed evidence that
the defendant had committed sexual acts against his brother as
well as the victim because the acts of sodomy were committed upon
both boys on the same day.

The victim could not relate what took

place that day without mentioning the defendant's conduct with
his brother. 777 P.2d 481.

But in State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583,

584-85 (Utah 1984), the court did not allow evidence in an auto
theft case that 20 minutes prior to the defendant's arrest in the
stolen car, the defendant had committed a robbery.

Similarly, in

Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), the court did not allow
evidence that the defendant had made nonconsensual sexual
advances to other women the same day he allegedly assaulted the
victim.
In this case, the State ostensibly offered evidence of
the March 2 9 burglary to show: (1) that unit number 711 had been
burglarized twice; (2) the location of the units; and (3) that
all the units were locked before the March 3 0 burglary.
469.

R. 4 85;

None of these alleged purposes justifies admission of

evidence of the March 29 burglary.
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The prior burglary was not

integrally linked to the March 30 burglary to the degree that the
State could not present its case without mention of it.
In fact, the State did not need to present evidence of the
March 29 burglary at all.
The manager of the storage units was able to testify that
when he made his last inspection of the grounds before the
March 3 0 burglary, all the units were locked and secure without
reference to the prior burglary.

R. 440.

The owner of unit 711

testified that she locked her unit prior to the March 3 0 burglary
and afterwards found that property had been stolen that was there
before.

There is no relevance to the fact that her unit was

burglarized twice.

R. 456-7.

The March 29 burglary was not

relevant to the location of the units burglarized on March 30.
Conversely, it is unclear what relevance the location of the
units burglarized on March 29 had to the March 3 0 burglary.

B. EVIDENCE OF THE MARCH 29 BURGLARY WAS NOT
ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW A COMMON SCHEME OR ESTABLISH A
MODUS OPERANDI.
Prior crime evidence cannot be used to prove a point not
really contested.

Doporto, 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21.

case, the only contested issue was identity.

In this

Evidence of a

common scheme or plan can be probative of identity.

However, the

court in this case fell "into the common error of equating acts
and circumstances which are merely similar in nature with the
more narrow common scheme or plan."

Featherson, 781 P.2d at 429

(quoting State v. Harris, 677 P.2d 202, 205 (Wash. Ct. App.
21

1984)).

Simple repetition of a similar criminal act does not

constitute the more precise common scheme or plan.
Utah Adv. Rep. at 22; Krezdorn. 639 F.2d at 1331.

Deporto, 3 08
"A loose

relevance of prior bad acts to a crime charged based on
unremarkable similarities of conduct is not sufficiently
probative to justify its admission."

Deporto 308 Utah Adv. Rep.

at 22 .
Likewise, evidence of a modus operandi can also be
relevant to identity.

In order to establish modus operandi,

there must be unusual or unique features common between the prior
crime and the crime charged.

Similar features which are common

to any crime of the same type do not suffice to establish a modus
operandi.

Id.

For example, in Sutphin v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 33 7
S.E.2d 897 (Va. Ct. App. 1985), the defendant was charged with
burglarizing a market by using a cinder block to break the glass
door.

Id. at 898-99.

At trial, the government introduced

evidence that a few hours earlier, Sutphin had attempted to
burglarize another market in the area by breaking the glass with
a brick.

The evidence was admitted to show identity through a

prior plan or scheme.
was not admissible.

JEd. at 899.

Id. at 900.

The court held the evidence

The court reasoned:

It is not enough that the other offense is merely
similar to the offense charged or closely
connected to it in time. The offenses must be
both closely related in time and tend to show a
general scheme or guilty knowledge and
intent . . . That the offenses were of the same
type does not evidence a general scheme . . .
[M]ore is required than merely proving repeated
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commission of crimes of the same class.
Id. at 899-900.
The court also rejected the argument that the manner in
which the two burglaries were committed was unusual and
distinctive thus demonstrating a modus operandi.

Id.

The court

held that breaking a glass door with a piece of cinder block to
commit a burglary was not a sufficiently distinctive feature to
prove identity.

Since the manner in which the burglaries were

committed was not unusual or distinctive, the evidence was
inadmissible.

.Id. at 900.

This case is strikingly similar to Sutphin.

In this

case, evidence of the prior storage unit burglaries demonstrates
only a repetition of a type of crime, not a step toward the
completion of an overall plan which would allow one to infer that
the same person committed both offenses.

Nor were there any

unusual or unique similarities between the two crimes.

The two

burglaries were similar factually in that both occurred at the
same storage facility and the locks had been cut on the units.
These similarities, however, are common to almost any burglary of
storage units.

Because the similarities between the two

burglaries are not particularly distinctive, they do not
establish a common plan or scheme.
operandi.

Nor do they establish a modus

Deporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22; Featherson, 781

P.2d at 428-29; compare with

State v. Rocco, 795 P.2d 1116 (Utah

1990) (evidence admissible of prior burglary on the same night
where defendant forced entry into both homes, bound victims with
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electrical wire, and set fires with gasoline).
As in Sutphin, evidence of the March 2 9 burglary did not
constitute a common plan or scheme probative of the issue of
identity.

Nor were the two crimes sufficiently distinct to

establish a modus operandi.

Therefore, evidence of the March 29

burglary was not admissible under Rule 4 04(b).

C. EVIDENCE OF THE MARCH 29 BURGLARY WAS NOT
HIGHLY PROBATIVE OF IDENTITY BECAUSE THERE WAS
NOT SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT SPRAGUE COMMITTED THE
PRIOR OFFENSE.
Evidence of prior crimes must be "strongly probative of a
material issue, a probativeness that cannot serve as a ruse for
showing that the defendant's propensity is such that he is likely
to have committed the kind of crime charged."
Adv. Rep. at 22.

Doporto, 308 Utah

For example, in Johnson, the fact that the

defendant had earlier in the day cashed stolen checks using the
same false identification as that used in the charged crime was
highly probative of the identity of the perpetrator.

Id.

Unlike Johnson, in this case, there is not sufficient
evidence to establish that Sprague committed the prior burglary.
Because the evidence tying Sprague to the March 2 9 burglary is
weak at best, the evidence is not highly probative of identity.
This case is similar to State v. Torqerson, 286 P.2d 800, 801
(Utah 1955) .

In Torqerson, the defendant was charged with

attempted burglary of a market.

The State introduced evidence

that earlier that evening about eight blocks from the scene of
the crime, a man was seen breaking the glass in the door of a
24

market and running towards the defendant's car.

The court held

that the evidence was inadmissible because there was not
sufficient evidence connecting the defendant with the prior
offense.

Id. at 800-02.

Since there was not sufficient evidence

establishing that the man seen breaking the glass was the
defendant, the evidence of the prior attempted burglary was not
relevant to establish identity.

Id.

Similarly, in this case, because there was not sufficient
evidence that Sprague committed the prior burglary, the evidence
was not highly probative of identity.

The only evidence the

State had to connect Sprague with the prior burglary was a
computer keyboard found in Spraguefs vehicle.

R. 373; 376.

The

keyboard was the same make as one stolen from the storage units
during the March 2 9 burglary.

But, there were no serial numbers

to positively identify it at as stolen property.

No other stolen

property from the March 2 9 burglary was found in Sprague's
vehicle.

R. 373; 376.

There was no evidence placing Sprague or

his vehicle at the storage unit on March 29.

Given the minimal

amount of evidence connecting Sprague with the March 29 burglary,
this evidence was not highly probative of identity and should not
have been admitted.

D. THE MINIMAL PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE MARCH 29
BURGLARY WAS SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY ITS
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT.
Even if evidence of the March 2 9 burglary were admissible
under Rule 404(b), it did not meet the requirements of Rule 403.
25

Several factors have been identified for consideration in
balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial
effect:
the strength of the evidence as to the commission
of the other crime, the similarities between the
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed
between the crimes, the need for the evidence,
the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree
to which the evidence probably will rouse the
jury to overmastering hostility.
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988).
Here, the State was easily able to present all relevant
evidence to the March 3 0 burglary in a coherent fashion without
reference to the prior burglary.

Sprague did not take the stand

and claim lack of intent or knowledge.

His was an alibi defense.

Identity was the only issue in the case.

Evidence of the

March 29 burglary had little probative value to establish
identity.

The March 2 9 burglary was not part of an overall plan

to commit the March 3 0 burglary, and there was nothing
distinctive about the way they were committed.

The two crimes

were similar only in those features common to any burglary of a
storage unit.

Lastly, the strength of the evidence tying Sprague

to the March 2 9 burglary was weak.
On the other side of the equation, "prior crime evidence
has inherent and unavoidable inflammatory potential."
308 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21.

Doporto,

These dangers are more likely and the

prejudice greater when, as in this case, the prior crime is of
the same type as the charged crime.

In this situation, the

probative value of the evidence is even less likely to outweigh
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the resulting confusion of the issues and prejudice to the
defendant.
1986).

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 n. 44 (Utah

In this case, the probative value of the March 29

burglary was too weak to overcome the presumption of prejudice to
Sprague.

Compounding the problem was the fact that no

instruction was given to the jury as to how this evidence should
be viewed.
The prejudice to Sprague was such that the error was not
harmless.

It is important to note that the mere fact that the

jury could have concluded that Sprague was guilty without the
improper evidence does not render the error harmless.

The

central question is whether it can be stated with assurance that
the jury was not influenced by the erroneous admission of the
evidence.

Doporto, 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24.

In Doporto, the

court recognized that the jury could have concluded the victim
was telling the truth without hearing the prior crime evidence.
But because the court could not conclude that the jury was
uninfluenced by the improper evidence when they assessed the
defendant's and the victim1s credibility, the error was not
harmless.

Id.

Evidence of the prior burglary was intertwined with
evidence of the charged crime.

Even some of the State's

witnesses became confused as to which night they were to testify
about.

R. 484; 540-41.

Sprague's co-defendant offered an alibi

for the night of the March 29 burglary.

The implication that

Sprague committed the prior burglary diverted attention away from
27

his alibi defense for the March 3 0 burglary.

The State could

then bypass Sprague's alibi defense by linking his guilt to the
March 2 9 burglary.

The jury could have believed his alibi, but

convicted anyway on the belief he was nonetheless guilty of the
March 2 9 burglary.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his convictions on all counts; remand Counts II, IV, V, VI, IX,
XII, XIII, XIV, and XV for a new trial; and remand Counts I, III,
VII, VIII, X, and XI with orders for dismissal.
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